Of the tortures and other crimes against the moral integrity” is how is titled the Title VII of the Book II of the Spanish Penal Code (CP). In it, is protected the legal good moral integrity, recognized as a fundamental right by the article 15 of the Spanish Constitution (CE). Such protection is carried out through the punishment of different crimes, as the crime of torture, the crime of degrading treatment or the crime of habitual maltreatment.

For the sake of simplifying the division of the content, and despite the five articles of which is made up this title, we will talk about three different points: 1) The crimes of the article 173; 2) The crimes against the moral integrity committed by public servant, and; 3) The inherent difficulties to the assessment of the moral damages.

1) The crimes of the article 173:

The article 173 deserves it own section because in the four points which form it, we find three different crimes. They differ in how each of them affects to the legal good moral integrity, or in the intensity with which they do it. In the first point of the article 173 is regulated the crime of degrading treatment, in the second the crime of habitual maltreatment and in the fourth the crime of slander or unjust humiliation of slight character.

Let us see first the content of the article 173, for later analyzing the each one of the crimes above mentioned. The article 173 says: “1. Who inflict to another person a degrading treatment, gravely damaging its moral integrity, will be punished with the punishment of imprisonment from six months to two years.
The same punishment will be imposed to who, knowing the location of the corpse of a person, repeatedly hides such information to the family or close friends of it.
With the same punishment will be punished those who, in the ambit of any employment or civil relation and availing themselves of their relation of superiority, repeatedly carry out against another hostile or humiliating acts which, without reaching the status of degrading treatment, suppose a grave harassment against the victim.
The same punishment will be imposed as well to who repeatedly carries out hostile or humiliating acts which, without reaching the status of degrading treatment, have the object of impeding the legitimate enjoyment of the house.
When according to the established in the article 31 bis, a legal person is liable of the crimes comprehended in the above three paragraphs, will be imposed to it the punishment of fine from six months to two years. Taking into account the rules established in the article 66 bis, the Judges and Courts may impose too the punishments included from the letter b) to a) of the seventh point of the article 33.

  1. Who usually carries out physical or psychic violence upon who is or has been its spouse or upon person who is or has been bound to it by analogous relation of affectivity even without living together, or upon the descendants, ascendants or brothers by nature, adoption or affinity, of the spouse or person living with it or own, or upon the minors or handicapped persons needed of special protection who lives with it or subject to the legal authority, tutelage or guardianship of the spouse or person living with it, or upon person protected by any other relation by who is integrated in the kernel of the family living together, as well as upon the persons who for their special vulnerability are subject to custody or guardianship in public or private centers, will be punished with the punishment of imprisonment from six months to three years, privation of the right to the possession and carrying of weapons from three to five years and, in its case, when the judge or court considers adequate to the interest of the minor or handicapped person needed of special protection, special disqualification for exercising the custody, tutelage or guardianship from one to five years, without prejudice of the punishments which may correspond to the crimes in which have been concreted the acts of physical or psychic violence.
    The punishment will be imposed in its superior half when some of the acts of violence are carried out in the presence of minors, or using weapons, or take place in the common domicile or in the domicile of the victim, or are carried out breaching a punishment contemplated in the article 48 or a preventive measure or of security or prohibition of the same nature.
    In the cases to which is referred this point, may be also imposed a measure of watched freedom.
  2. For appreciating the regularity to which is referred the above point, will be taken into account the number of acts of violence accredited, as well as the temporal proximity between them, regardless of whether such violence has been exercised upon the same or different victims of the comprehended in this article, and of whether the violent acts has been or not the object of trial in prior procedures.
  3. Who causes slander or unjust humiliation of slight character, when the offended is a person to which is referred the point 2 of the article 173, will be punished with the punishment of permanent location from five to thirty days, always in different domicile and far from the victim´s domicile, or community services from five to thirty days, or fine from one to four months, the latter only in the cases in which concur the circumstances expressed in the second point of the article 84.
    The same punishments will be imposed to who makes use of expressions, or behaviors, or proposals of sexual character which create in the victim an objective hostil or intimidating situation, without constituting graver crimes.
    The crimes typified in the above two paragraphs are only prosecutable through report of the offended person or its legal representative.

As we have already said, in the first point of the article 173 is regulated the crime of degrading treatment. In it, like in the rest of the crimes of which is made up this Title VII, the legal good protected is the moral integrity, which according to the Provincial Court of Palencia´s sentence number 5/2023 has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as “the right of the person to not suffer sensations of pain or humiliating physical or psychic pains, this is the right of not being subject to methods or procedures which provoke a sensation of humiliation in the person which make it to lose this consideration for being reduced to the condition of mere thing provoking a sensation of grave unease or distress.»

By its wording we observe that, it is a crime of mere activity and not of result, being the relevant for appreciating its concurrence that the action or omission carried out by the active subject of the crime has to have the enough intensity for affecting the legal good moral integrity of the passive subject of the crime. Such intensity will be conditioned above all by a factor, its duration, which must be prolonged and repeated during a period of time, though we cannot discards the possibility that the damage to the legal good moral integrity is caused by a single action, when this by its own is capable of it. In relation with the above the Provincial Court of Madrid´s sentence of 667/2023 says: “For this, the ambit of the article 173, like the ambit of the article 175, will be reserved to those facts in which the degradation has a certain intensity. The necessary qualification of gravity demands a notorious and persistent duration, without requiring its integration in the concept of psychic damage, since it is regarded as a crime of injuries. The degrading action is considered as an attempt against the dignity which, normally, will require a continuous behavior -suitable to the typical expression of the treatment, distinguished from the mere attack-, though is possible too, that the degrading action comprehends one only action of damaging intensity enough for producing the typical result.

The action or omission which affect to the legal good, moral integrity, will be the objective type of the crime, and will consist in a degrading treatment, defined by the Spanish Supreme Court in its Sentence of 23 March 1993, as “the reduction of a person to the condition of object, of bundle, of mere thing, the use of it for the amusement of the people, its annulment as free person, negative, in short, of its dignity as man.

On the other hand, the subjective type of the crime only comprehends the malicious commission, without being necessary that this malice is motivated by a specific goal. In other words, the intention of the active subject should be to cause a degrading treatment to the victim, in a way that is gravelly affected its moral integrity (direct malice), or at least, it should accept this result as possible consequence of its action or omission (eventual malice).

So far we have exclusively see the crime of degrading treatment of the first paragraph of the firs point of the article 173. However, this first point extends the application of the punishment envisaged for the crime of degrading treatment to other scenarios: 1) To who, having knowledge of the location of the corpse of a person, repeatedly hides this information to the family and close friends of it; 2) Those who, in the ambit of any employment or civil relation and availing themselves of their relation of superiority, repeatedly carry out against another hostile or humiliating acts which, without reaching the status of degrading treatment, suppose a grave harassment against the victim, and; 3) To who repeatedly carries out hostile or humiliating acts which, without reaching the status of degrading treatment, have the object of impeding the legitimate enjoyment of the house.

The first scenario does not seem to have a really defined ambit, in it are not specified the circumstances in which have to have died this person, therefore it can be applied to any kind of death, as by accident or even natural. A different question would be if the death has been caused by another person, since in these cases we should be rather taking about a crime of covering up of the article 451 CP.

In the second scenario, it is talked about repeated acts of hostility and humiliating, carried out within an employment or civil relation and availing the author of its relation of superiority, which without constituting a degrading treatment suppose a grave harassment to the victim. This type makes us to remember the crime of harassment or stalking of the article 172 ter CP. However, there exist big differences between them: 1) The legal good protected is not the same, in the crime of harassment or stalking of the article 172 ter CP it is the freedom, while the article 173.1 is protecting the moral integrity; 2) The article 172 ter CP establishes four specific behaviors which can give rise to the crime, while the article 173.1 only talks about hostile and humiliating acts, and; 3) In the crime of harassment or stalking of the article 172 ter CP is not demanded that the crime is committed in the ambit of a employment or civil relation as consequence of a hierarchical organization, what does require the article 173.1 CP. Nevertheless, there exist also important resemblances between them, like the demand for a repeated behavior. In any case, the scope of application of each article seems very clear, even though the use of the word “harassment” in the article 173.1 may carry us to confusions. On the other hand, the acts of humiliation and harassment do not need to reach the necessary intensity for being regarded as degrading treatment, in order to be punished withe the same punishment, something which is a consequence of the ambit where this acts of humiliation and harassment take place, the employment or civil relation to which we referred above.

And the third scenario does seem to describe the same behavior typified by the article 172 CP, where is expressly established that “The punishments will be imposed in its superior half too, when the coercion exercised has as object to impede the legitimate enjoyment of the home.” For distinguishing both, we have to attend to the legal good protected by the criminal behavior and the intention of its author. If what is done, affects to the right of freedom of the victim, imposing to it to make what the law does not forbid or obliging it to make what it does not want, and besides, we can prove that it was the intention of the active subject, we will be before a crime of coercion of the article 172 CP, but if the legal good affected is the moral integrity as consequence of being suffering a degrading treatment the victim, and besides, this is the intention of the author of the crime, we will be before a crime of degrading treatment of the article 173.1 CP.

Lastly, at the end of this first point of the article 173, are punished the legal persons who are liable according to the article 31 bis of any of the three crimes which we have already mentioned, in other words: 1) To who, having knowledge of the location of the corpse of a person, repeatedly hides this information to the family and close friends of it; 2) Those who, in the ambit of any employment or civil relation and availing themselves of their relation of superiority, repeatedly carry out against another hostile or humiliating acts which, without reaching the status of degrading treatment, suppose a grave harassment against the victim, and; 3) To who repeatedly carries out hostile or humiliating acts which, without reaching the status of degrading treatment, have the object of impeding the legitimate enjoyment of the house.

Now we have to talk about the second point of this article 173. In it, as we already said, is punished the crime of habitual maltreatment. Like the crime of degrading treatment, the legal good protected is the moral integrity, but this is affected in a particular way on account of the special kind of active subject who is able to commit the crime. The Provincial Court of Madrid´s sentence number 1614/2023 says: “Concerning the first of the crimes mentioned, we points out that as the Spanish Supreme Court´s sentence 665/2019 of 14 January 2020 (EDJ 2020/505159), the crime of habitual maltreatment envisaged in the art. 173.2 CP sanctions the consolidation by the active subject of a clime of violence and domination, of an psychological and moral atmosphere unbreathable, capable of annulling the victim and impeding its free development as person, precisely for the fear, the humiliation and distress induced, creating the acts of physical and psychic violence which form it for their repetition, that unbreathable atmosphere or ambient of systematic maltreatment.
More recently the STS 684/2021 of 15 September determines that with the habitual maltreatment the legal good which direct and specifically protects the article 173.2 of the Penal Code is the pacific cohabitation between persons linked by family ties or by close relations of affect and cohabitation to which the own type refers.
(…) The habitual maltreatment in the domestic violence is an autonomous crime whose legal good protected is the moral integrity of the victim, trying to impede the living of a hostil and humiliating continuos state. And, what is important, its way of manifestation can be physical, but also, psychological, being able to cause, even in some cases, more pain to the victims the psychological than the physical, since perhaps the victims are not even able to perceive their condition as such, which aggravates the fact of the not reporting in a lot of cases and the permanence in the time of the psychological maltreatment that may affect, and with gravity, to the psyche.

As we have hinted, it is a special own crime since are only able to be active subjects of it the persons who have any of the relations that the type demands, but in not place is demanded that this maltreatment has to be carried out within a home, though logically it will be the ambit where it takes place the most of the cases.

The objective type of this crime, will be constituted by this physical or psychic violence usually exercised upon the passive subjects mentioned in the second point of the article 173. The last two features, the regularity and the special relation between the passive subject and the active, is what distinguishes the habitual maltreatment from the degrading treatment. To the above we have to add that, in the case of habitual maltreatment is clearly specified that, may be punished separately the acts of physical or physic violence which have given rise to the degrading treatment, in the own article 173.2. Does it mean that in the crime of degrading treatment cannot be punished separately the acts of physical or physic violence which have given rise to the degrading treatment?, does it mean that, in the crime of degrading treatment is not demanded the feature of regularity? We have already seen the answer to the latter question, the regularity will serve for verifying that a behavior has affected with the enough intensity to the legal good moral integrity for understanding the existence of the crime of degrading treatment, for one only action, if it is grave, can also determine the existence of the crime of degrading treatment. And the answer to the former question, is not difficult either, for at the end of the Title VII we have the article 177 which also says that “If in the crimes described in the preceding articles, besides the attempt against the moral integrity, is produced injuries or harm to the life, physical integrity, health, sexual freedom or goods of the victim or a third party, the facts will be punished separately with the punishment which correspond to them for the crimes committed, except when it is specially punished by the law.” What seems to say to us the same that this last part of the article 173.2 but with other words. Notwithstanding all the above, this would be also the criteria followed if the general rules of the article 8 CP were applied.

Let us now talk again about this essential feature for existence of the crime of habitual maltreatment, this regularity. The regularity of the second point is defined in the third point of the same article, specifying that for its existence we have to attend to: 1) The number of acts of violence accredited, and; 2) The temporal proximity between them. Regardless of whether this acts of violence have been committed against the same or different victim, always that they are one of the mentioned in the second point of the article 173, or whether they have been tried in previous procedures, of course always that the active subject of the crime was not already punished for them for a crime of habitual maltreatment, for then the principle ne bis in idem would be infringed, but for any of the crimes that the acts of physical or psychic violence constitute separately, as a crime of injuries.

However, this third point of the article 173 does not specify if there should be a determined number of acts of physical or physic violence for understanding committed the crime of habitual maltreatment, nor what should be the temporal proximity between them. For completing this void, we can use this excerpt from the Provincial Court of Palencia´s sentence number 5/2023: “Another question which arises is what should be understood for habitual maltreatment. The sentence of 26 December 2014, number 586 of the Supreme Court regarding this said that “the stand more habitual understands that the demands of regularity are satisfied from the third violent action, criteria which does not have more support than the analogical application of the concept of regularity that the article 94 of the Penal Code establishes for the substitution of the punishments. Another interpretative line, disregarding the above automatism has understood that the relevant for appreciating the regularity, rather than the plurality in itself is the repetition or frequency which supposes a continuance of the violent treatment, being important that the court reaches to the conviction that the victim lives in an state of permanent aggression. This is the more correct stand, this is the regularity should not be interpreted in a legal sense of multi-recidivism in misdemeanor of maltreatment -what could constitute a problem of non bis in idem- but it seems more correct to opt for a natural criteria understanding for regularity the repetition of acts of identical content, but not being strictly the plurality what transforms the facts in crime, but the relation between the author and the victim more the frequency with which it happens, this is, the continuance of the violent treatment, from which is deduced the necessity of considering it as an autonomous crime. It is not a crime of injuries elevated to crime by the repetition since cannot be speculated around if they were three or more than three the occasions in which was produced the violence, as has been recognized for some doctrines for demanding the presence of the crime for the regularity of the maltreatment, but the important is that the judge arrives to that conviction that the victim lives in a state of permanent aggression. In this direction the regularity should be understood a criminal concept-social not as a legal-formal concept, therefore an habitual behavior will be of who acts repeatedly in the same direction with or without previous convictions, since them will act as proofs of the regularity, which also can be proved by more means…in this direction we should regard the violence as all action or omission of one or varios members of the family which gives rise to the humiliations or similar situations in the different members of the family, a broad concept which comprehend the varied ways of maltreatment that take place in the real life.”.

Regarding the article 173, only left to talk about the crime of slander or unjust humiliation of slight character typified in the fourth point. The crime of injury is defined in the article 208 of the CP as: “It is injury the action or expression which harms the dignity of another person, damaging its fame or attempting against its own esteem.” However, this article 208 only punishes the “injuries which, for their nature, effects and circumstances, are regarded as grave by the public concept”, without prejudice that the rest may be punished according to this article 173.4 CP.

The slanders or unjust humiliations of slight character of the article 173.4 CP are characterized for being a special own crime, as the crime of habitual maltreatment, since the active subject of the crime must be related with the passive by any of the ways mentioned in the article 173.2 CP. This essential characteristic is what distinguishes them from the slanders of the article 208, for lacking this the slight slanders cannot be punished. Furthermore, in the case that the slanders uttered by the special active subject of the article 173.2 are of grave character, they should be punished through the article 208 or 209 for having envisaged a bigger punishment in application of the fourth rule of the article 8 of the CP. Thereby, what has been done by article 173.4 is to extend the penal protection for the crime of slanders to specific cases, for these special qualities of the active subject of the crime.

Besides extending the punishment to the slight slanders, when there exists between the active and passive subject of the crime any of the relations mentioned in the article 173.2, this article 173.4 diminishes the requisites for being prosecutable the crime, for in its last paragraph is specified that are only prosecutable by report of the offended. Something which distinguishes them, and a lot, from the grave slanders of the article 208 and 209 of the CP, for these demand a lawsuit from the offended or its legal representative (art. 215 CP and art. 804 LECrim), and not only this, in the Spanish Criminal Procedure Act (LECrim) is added the requisite that previously has to be celebrated an act of conciliation between the accused and the accuser, or at least, it has to have been attempted without effect, for being admitted the lawsuit (art. 804 LECrim).

This last great difference makes us to think again about the type applicable in the case in which are uttered grave slanders and not slight between those mentioned in the article 173.2, for if in the articles 208 and 209 CP it is true that the punishment is bigger, in the article 173.4 the requisites demanded by the legislator for prosecuting the crime are less, and it is not less true, that the punishments fit better to the special active and passive subjects of the crime. All will depend on the judgment of the Examining Magistrate who will be who admits the report or lawsuit, whether in that case decides that is obligatory the act of conciliation and the lodging of a lawsuit or not.

In order to end with the last point of this article 173, we are obliged to add that, the article 173 also punished the behavior which consist in aiming to other person with “expressions, behaviors or proposals of sexual character which create in the victim an objective hostile or intimidating situation, without constituting graver crimes.” These behaviors will be punished with the same punishment that the slanders or unjust humiliations of slight character, and are only prosecutable through report of the offended person or its legal representative.

2) The crimes against the moral integrity committed by public servant:

The crimes against the moral integrity committed by public servant are regulated from the article 174 to the article 176. In the article 174 is typified the crime of torture, in the article 175 the attacks against the moral integrity not regarded as tortures, and in the article 176 when the public servant not complying with the duties inherent to its charge, allows that a person attempts against the moral integrity of another. Let us now follow the order of such articles for seeing their content.

In relation to the crime of torture the article 174 says: “1. Commits torture the authority or public servant who, abusing of its charge, and with the goal of obtaining a confession or information of any person or of punishing it for any fact which it has committed or it is suspected that it has committed, or for any reason based in some kind of discrimination, subjects it to conditions or procedures which for their nature, duration or other circumstances, suppose to it mental or physical sufferings, the suppression or decrease of its faculties of knowledge, discerning or decision or which, in any other way, attempt against its moral integrity. The guilty of torture will be punished with the punishment of imprisonment from two to six years if the attempt is grave, and of imprisonment from one to three years if it is not. Besides the above punishments will be imposed, in any case, the punishment of absolute disqualification from eight to twelve years.

  1. In the same punishments will incur, respectively, the authority or public servant of penitentiary institutions or of centers of protection or correction of minors who commits, with detainees, internees or prisoners, the acts to which is referred the above paragraph.

The crime of torture is an aggravated subtype for the searching of the specific goals envisaged in the penal type, which are two: 1) To obtain a confession or information from any person, and; 2) To punish for nay fact which it has committed, or it is suspected that it has committed, or for any reason based in some kind of discrimination.

The crime of torture is also a special own crime, since it only can be committed by authority or public servant, being extended in the second point of the article 174 the liability, to the authorities or public servants of penitentiary institutions or of centers of protection or correction of minors who commits the facts described in the first paragraph, upon their detainees, internees or prisoners.

The objective type of the crime consists in subjecting a person “to conditions or procedures which for their nature, duration or other circumstances, suppose to it mental or physical sufferings, the suppression or decrease of its faculties of knowledge, discerning or decision or which, in any other way, attempt against its moral integrity.” Something which also transform it into a crime of mere activity and not of result, for it will be enough with carrying out any of the behaviors described in the type for being it consummated.

On the other hand, the subjective type of the crime only comprehends the malicious modality, including the eventual, hence the author of the crime should want and know that with its acts is attempting against the moral integrity of a person, or at least, has to represent to itself this possibility. Furthermore, such actuation should be motivated for any of the goals which we pointed out at the beginning, obtaining a confession or information, or subjecting the victim to a punishment.

Now is the turn of the article 175 which says: “The authority or public servant who, abusing of its charge and out of the cases comprehended in the above article, attempts against the moral integrity of a person will be punished with the punishment of imprisonment from tow to four years if the attempt is grave, and of imprisonment from six months to two years if it is not. Will be imposed, in any case, to the author, besides the punishments pointed out, the special disqualification for public charge or employment from two to four years.

Being a crime which can only be committed y authority or public servant, as the envisaged in the article 174, we are too before a special own crime.

The article 175 has come to fill the gaps of those cases which cannot be punished according to the article 174, not specifying a concrete kind of behavior, or a special motive to carry them out. Therefore, the objective type of the crime will be consummated for any kind of behavior which attempts against the moral integrity of the victim. And the subjective type comprehends a malicious behavior being enough with knowing and wanting to harm the moral integrity of the victim, without having a special motivation.

The article 175, unlike the article 174, distinguishes between the grave attempt against the moral integrity from those which are not. This distinction will depend on the intensity with which has been affected the legal good moral integrity as consequence of the criminal behavior.

Lastly, the article 176 says: “Will be imposed the punishments respectively established in the preceding articles to the authority or public servant who, not complying with the duties of its charge, allows to other person to execute the facts envisaged in them.

Again we are before a special own crime and of mere activity. Who commits it should be an authority of public servant, and it will consist in omitting the fulfillment of its duties for allowing that other person carries out any of the behaviors described in the article 175 or 176.

Therefore, the objective type will consist in this omission of the duties inherent to the charge o authority or public servant, while the subjective type, like in the above cases, will only admit the malicious modality, or at least eventual, in other words, it will require that the authority or public servant knows and wants that with such omission a third will attempt against the moral integrity of a person, or at least, it should be conscious of the possibility that with this behavior the moral integrity of the victim may be harmed.

3) The inherent difficulties to the assessing of the moral damages:

The point 1 of the article 109 CP says: “The execution of a fact described by the law as crime obliges to repair, in the terms envisaged by the law, the damages and prejudices caused by it.

The problem is in a lot of cases to determine the amount of this reparation. When the crime has caused material damages, it will be easy to assess them, even when this damages are physical, since for them we can make use of the scale established in the Law 35/2015, which though it is only of obligatory application to the damages derived from a traffic accident, it can serve as orientation too for the damages derived from a malicious crime. With moral damages does not happen the same, and they are the most usual damages derived from a crime which harms the moral integrity of the victim.

Let us now see this little excerpt from the Provincial Court of Palma de Mallorca´s sentence number 111/2023: “As the jurisprudence has repeatedly manifested, the moral damages, due to their own nature, are not objectively assessable, nor have to be them proven when their existence is inferred directly from the facts (S.T.S. 907/2000 of 29 May and 1490/2005 of 12 December); thereby, for their appreciation and assessment, will be enough with either to prove them or to be them a natural consequence of the proved facts or, using the words of the Supreme Court, that they “flow” in a natural way from the facts and have certain relevance ( STS of 24 of April 2014).

This from the Spanish Supreme Court´s sentence number 661/2023 is also interesting: “In any case, it is important to stress that the compensatory amount set is reasonable and is sufficiently explained. It is adjusted to usual standards. It is appropriate to remember using as example the Spanish Supreme Court´s sentence number 97/2016, of 28 June: “…the economic translation of a reparation for moral damages is a duty reserved to the arbitrariness of the Court of instance and, therefore, cannot be appealed in cassation. It is possible to discuss the basis but not the concrete amount, which is not only not limited by arithmetics rules; but besides the moral damages cannot be assessed with accuracy ( STS 957/2007, of 28 November). When the assessment is fitted to usual standards and parameters that, without being exact, turn around to criteria commonly shared and recognizable, will not be necessary a reasoning, impossible, which justifies why is given “x” euros and not a slight superior amount, or slight inferior amount. Only when the set amount does not have the minimum basis and, besides, does not follow the usual or understandable standards, in a way which it is presented as the fruit of pure arbitrariness or whims is possible the review as remember to us the Supreme Court Sentence 957/2007.»

Therefore, from the above we can extract the following conclusions about the moral damages:

  • They cannot be objectively assessed, nor have to be them proven when their existence is unquestionably inferred from the facts.
  • Their assessment is duty of the Court of instance.
  • Their assessment should fit the usual standards and parameters that, without being exact, turn around to criteria commonly shared and recognizable.
  • It is not necessary a motivation in the sentence of why is given an amount and not other slightly superior or inferior.

Víctor López Camacho.

More on my website: victorlopezcamacho.com

Twitter: @victorsuperlope.